Rate snapshot
| Fed funds target | 3.75% to 4.00% | Last changed Sept. 17, 2026, a 25 bp increase |
| 5-yr Treasury | 5.03% | 10/07/2026, flat from 10/06, the bank and life co pricing base |
| 10-yr Treasury | 5.28% | 10/07/2026, up 1 bp, sets the CMBS and life co 10-yr base |
| SOFR | 3.88% | 10/07/2026, 140 bp below the 10-yr, the debt fund index |
| Indicative CRE quotes | 6.36% to 13.00% | 10/08/2026 survey, bank through bridge, all property types |
Initial jobless claims came in at 197,000 this morning for the week ending October 3, down from a revised 199,000 and holding the four-week average at 198,000. A labor market that will not loosen is why the September FOMC minutes, released yesterday afternoon, showed participants unanimously behind the September hike with most expecting one more before year-end. For a sponsor sizing debt today, that backdrop matters less than it seems. The decision in front of you is a choice among lender types, and getting it wrong costs more than any plausible rate move.
Here is the finding. We ran four real term sheet structures against the same $12,000,000 small-bay industrial acquisition: a regional bank, a life company, a CMBS conduit, and a debt fund. The quoted coupons spanned 55 basis points, from 6.80% to 7.35%. The actual cost of the debt, measured over the four-year hold the sponsor will probably take, spanned 333 basis points. The spread in what you pay is six times the spread in what you were quoted.
The gap does not come from the rate. It comes from the exit. This post works the arithmetic so you can run it on your own term sheets before you sign one.
The asset
An 86,000 square foot multi-tenant small-bay industrial property in a Florida secondary market, 93% leased to 14 tenants on a staggered rollover schedule. CBRE’s H1 2026 cap rate survey reports industrial among the property types that compressed most over the first half of the year.
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Purchase price | $12,000,000 |
| In-place year-1 NOI | $786,000 |
| Going-in cap rate | 6.55% |
| Closing costs (title, survey, Phase I, PCA, legal) | $240,000 |
| Total capitalization | $12,240,000 |
The sponsor’s business plan says a ten-year hold. The sponsor’s track record says four years. That divergence is the entire subject of this post, and it is the single most common reason a middle-market borrower overpays for debt.
Four term sheets, one asset
| Terms | Bank | Life company | CMBS | Debt fund |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coupon | 6.85% fixed | 6.80% fixed | 7.35% fixed | SOFR + 325 |
| Term | 5 years | 10 years | 10 years | 24 mo + 2 x 6 |
| Amortization | 25 years | 30 years | 30 years | Interest only |
| Max LTV | 65% | 60% | 70% | 65% |
| Min DSCR | 1.25x | 1.30x | 1.25x | 1.15x |
| Min debt yield | 8.5% | 8.5% | 9.0% | 8.5% |
| Origination | 0.75% | 0.50% | 1.00% | 1.00% |
| Exit fee | None | None | None | 0.50% |
| Prepayment | 3/2/1/1/open | Yield maintenance | 2-yr lock, then defeasance | Open after mo. 12 |
| Recourse | Full | Non-recourse | Non-recourse | Carve-outs |
Every coupon above sits inside the indicative ranges published for October 8, 2026: bank fixed 6.36% to 9.53%, life company ten-year 6.78% to 8.78%, CMBS ten-year 7.28% to 8.78%, and 36-month bridge 6.45% to 13.00%. None is a stretch quote.
Why agency is not on this list
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and HUD lend on multifamily and seniors housing. They do not lend on industrial. A sponsor who buys small-bay industrial instead of a comparable apartment building gives up access to the cheapest and most prepayment-flexible capital in commercial real estate, and that absence is a real part of the cost of the asset class. If you are comparing an industrial deal to a multifamily deal on levered returns, the lender menu is part of the comparison, not a footnote to it.
What each lender will actually lend
Every term sheet carries three sizing constraints, and the loan is the smallest of the three. Quoting a maximum LTV tells you almost nothing about proceeds, because on a 6.55% cap deal in a 5%-plus Treasury world, DSCR usually binds first.
| Lender | LTV cap | DSCR cap | Debt yield cap | Loan | Actual LTV | Binding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regional bank | $7,800,000 | $7,515,355 | $9,247,059 | $7,515,355 | 62.6% | DSCR |
| Life company | $7,200,000 | $7,728,589 | $9,247,059 | $7,200,000 | 60.0% | LTV |
| CMBS conduit | $8,400,000 | $7,605,533 | $8,733,333 | $7,605,533 | 63.4% | DSCR |
| Debt fund | $7,800,000 | $9,585,950 | $9,247,059 | $7,800,000 | 65.0% | LTV |
The 70% that is really 63.4%
The CMBS sheet advertises the highest leverage of the four at 70%. It delivers the third-highest proceeds. A 1.25x DSCR test against a 7.35% coupon on a 30-year schedule caps the loan at $7,605,533, which is $794,467 short of the $8,400,000 the 70% headline implies. A sponsor who built an equity model around 70% leverage and then signed a CMBS term sheet is short three quarters of a million dollars at the closing table.
The debt fund does the opposite. Its interest-only structure removes amortization from the debt service calculation, which lifts its DSCR capacity to $9,585,950 and leaves LTV as the binding constraint. That is why the most expensive index in the group produces the largest loan at $7,800,000 and the smallest equity check at $4,440,000. Interest-only is a proceeds tool, not a rate tool, and it is frequently worth more than 50 basis points of coupon.
What four years actually costs
Now the part that term sheets do not show you. Below is every dollar of debt cost over a 48-month hold: origination, interest, any rollover cost for a loan that matures before the sale, and the cost of getting out. The debt fund path includes a refinance at month 36 into the bank’s five-year sheet, because a 24-month bridge with two six-month extensions cannot reach a four-year exit on its own.
| 48-month hold | Bank | Life company | CMBS | Debt fund |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loan proceeds | $7,515,355 | $7,200,000 | $7,605,533 | $7,800,000 |
| Equity required | $4,724,645 | $5,040,000 | $4,634,467 | $4,440,000 |
| Origination | $56,365 | $36,000 | $76,055 | $78,000 |
| Interest, 48 months | $1,992,322 | $1,915,524 | $2,191,795 | $2,198,934 |
| Rollover fees at month 36 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $103,500 |
| Prepayment or exit cost | $69,925 | $578,307 | $814,010 | $269,337 |
| Defeasance transaction costs | $0 | $0 | $75,000 | $0 |
| Total cost of debt | $2,118,612 | $2,529,831 | $3,156,860 | $2,649,771 |
| Principal paid down | $522,878 | $337,529 | $323,405 | $122,102 |
| Balance at exit | $6,992,477 | $6,862,471 | $7,282,127 | $7,677,898 |
| Effective annual cost | 7.05% | 8.78% | 10.38% | 8.49% |
The bank wins at 7.05%. The CMBS loan, quoted 50 basis points above the bank, costs 333 basis points more. That is $1,038,248 of additional cost on a deal whose entire year-one NOI is $786,000. The lender whose coupon looked cheapest, the life company at 6.80%, finishes third.
The life company is cheaper on rate and $411,219 more expensive
This is the decomposition every sponsor should run. Split each lender’s gap against the bank into the part driven by rate and fees, and the part driven by the exit.
| Versus the bank, 48 months | Rate and fees | Exit cost | Total gap | Exit share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Life company | -$97,163 | +$508,382 | +$411,219 | 124% |
| CMBS conduit | +$219,163 | +$819,085 | +$1,038,248 | 79% |
| Debt fund | +$331,747 | +$199,412 | +$531,159 | 38% |
Read the first row carefully. Over four years the life company charges $97,163 less than the bank in interest and origination combined. It is genuinely the cheaper lender on everything a term sheet puts in large type. Then yield maintenance adds $508,382 at the exit and the loan ends up $411,219 worse. The exit cost is 124% of the total gap, which is to say the prepayment clause does not just erode the rate advantage, it reverses it more than five times over.
The mechanism is not complicated. Yield maintenance makes the lender whole on the interest it expected for the remaining six years, discounted at a reinvestment rate. At a 6.80% coupon against a 5.09% six-year Treasury, the lender is short 171 basis points a year on $6.9 million, and you write a check for the present value. Defeasance on the CMBS loan is worse because the coupon is higher, 7.35% against the same 5.09%, widening the gap to 226 basis points and producing an $814,010 premium plus $75,000 of transaction costs for the consultant, accountant, successor borrower, and rating agency.
Sensitivity: the answer changes with the hold
Effective annual cost of debt at six different exit dates, same four term sheets. Paths that outlive their term are refinanced into the bank’s five-year sheet at today’s rate, with new origination and third-party costs included.
| Lender | 2 yrs | 3 yrs | 4 yrs | 5 yrs | 7 yrs | 10 yrs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regional bank | 8.09% | 7.25% | 7.05% | 6.71% | 6.98% | 6.47% |
| Life company | 12.18% | 9.94% | 8.78% | 8.07% | 7.19% | 6.41% |
| CMBS conduit | 15.19% | 12.00% | 10.38% | 9.37% | 8.16% | 7.02% |
| Debt fund | 7.88% | 7.63% | 8.49% | 7.93% | 7.38% | 7.23% |
The debt fund is the cheapest option at two years and the second most expensive at ten. The bank wins at three, four, five, and seven years. The life company, the lowest coupon in the group, does not become the cheapest choice until month 107, which is 8.9 years into a ten-year loan. The CMBS loan never becomes the cheapest at any hold period inside its own term.
That last point deserves emphasis. A sponsor can hold a conduit loan all ten years, pay it off at maturity with no defeasance at all, and still finish behind a bank that had to be refinanced once along the way. The extra coupon compounds on a slower amortization schedule for a full decade.
The floating-rate question
The debt fund figures above hold SOFR flat at 3.88% for the bridge period, which is an assumption and not a forecast, particularly with the FOMC minutes pointing toward another increase and the next meeting set for October 27 and 28.
| SOFR assumption | Start coupon | Total 4-yr cost | Effective | Versus bank |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Down 100 bp, 2.88% | 6.13% | $2,415,771 | 7.74% | +0.70 pts |
| Down 50 bp, 3.38% | 6.63% | $2,532,771 | 8.12% | +1.07 pts |
| Unchanged, 3.88% | 7.13% | $2,649,771 | 8.49% | +1.45 pts |
| Up 50 bp, 4.38% | 7.63% | $2,766,771 | 8.87% | +1.82 pts |
| Up 100 bp, 4.88% | 8.13% | $2,883,771 | 9.24% | +2.20 pts |
| Up 200 bp, 5.88% | 9.13% | $3,117,771 | 9.99% | +2.95 pts |
A 100 basis point SOFR rally is worth 75 basis points of effective cost to this borrower, and it still leaves the debt fund 70 basis points behind the bank. It takes a decline of roughly 200 basis points, to a 1.88% SOFR, just to pull level. The floating-rate decision on a four-year hold is therefore not really a rate bet. It is a bet on proceeds and flexibility, and it should be priced as one.
Simplifications: SOFR is held constant for each scenario rather than run along a forward curve, and the cost of the rate cap the debt fund will require is excluded, so the floating-rate column is better than a real quote. Yield maintenance and defeasance are computed as the present value of the remaining contractual stream discounted at a 5.09% six-year Treasury, interpolated from the 5.03% five-year and 5.15% seven-year, with a 1% of balance floor. Actual documents vary: some use Treasury plus a spread, some add a prepayment premium, and defeasance costs move with the agency curve on the settlement date. Refinance legs assume today’s 6.85% bank rate holds, which no one should treat as a forecast. Effective annual cost is total debt cost divided by initial proceeds divided by the hold in years. Taxes, the deductibility of prepayment premiums, and the equity return effects of different proceeds levels are excluded.
How to run this on your own term sheets
- Write down the hold period your track record supports, not the one in your business plan. If your last four deals sold in years three to five, model years three to five.
- Size every sheet three ways: LTV, DSCR, and debt yield. Take the smallest. Record which constraint binds, because that tells you what to negotiate.
- Build the amortization schedule and get the balance at your expected exit month. Prepayment cost is always a function of that balance, not the original loan.
- Compute the exit cost at that month under the actual clause. Step-down is a percentage. Yield maintenance and defeasance require a present value calculation against a reinvestment rate.
- Add origination, exit fees, and any rollover cost for a loan that matures before your sale, including new third-party reports and legal.
- Divide total cost by initial proceeds by years held, rank the sheets, then check whether the ranking changes one year shorter and two years longer.
- Price the proceeds difference separately. If one lender gives you $600,000 more, decide what that is worth to your equity before you compare coupons.
Red flags in a lender-type comparison
- A maximum LTV quoted with no DSCR or debt yield test shown. The constraint that binds is the one that was left off the page.
- Yield maintenance with no floor stated, or a floor expressed as a percentage of the original loan rather than the outstanding balance.
- A defeasance clause with no open period in the final months of the term. Most conduit loans go open three to six months before maturity, and that provision is worth real money.
- A lockout that runs longer than your shortest plausible exit. A two-year lockout on an asset you might sell in month 20 is not a penalty, it is a prohibition.
- Bridge extension options conditioned on tests you have not modeled. An extension you cannot exercise is a 24-month loan with a 36-month label.
- Interest-only presented as a rate concession. It is a proceeds concession, and it leaves you with more balance at exit and less equity build.
- Any comparison of a five-year and a ten-year sheet that does not price the refinance at year five.
How QuadBlock can help
QuadBlock Capital provides bridge, transitional, and permanent financing from $250,000 to $30,000,000 on multifamily, industrial, retail, self-storage, specialty, and ground-up residential assets, in every state except Oregon and Nevada. We have closed more than 30 transactions, and we will run the hold-period arithmetic above on your term sheets alongside our own quote, including the sheets we lose. Send the deal at quadblockcapital.com and we will tell you which constraint is binding and what your exit is going to cost.
This article is for general educational purposes and is not tax, legal, or investment advice. The structures modeled here are illustrative composites built from published indicative rate ranges, not offers to lend, and terms vary by lender and transaction. Prepayment and defeasance calculations depend on the specific language of your loan documents and on market conditions at payoff. The tax treatment of prepayment premiums, origination costs, and defeasance expense depends on your circumstances. Consult your own counsel, accountant, and tax advisor before acting on any of this.
Sources
- Federal Reserve, Open Market Operations: federal funds target range and history of changes
- U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury Par Yield Curve Rates, October 2026
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Secured Overnight Financing Rate
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York, SOFR Averages and Index
- Federal Reserve, Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, September 15-16, 2026, released October 7, 2026
- Federal Reserve, FOMC Meeting Calendars, 2026
- U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims, week ending October 3, 2026
- Commercial Loan Direct, Commercial Rates and Key Mortgage Indexes, October 8, 2026 (indicative quote ranges)
- CBRE, U.S. Cap Rate Survey H1 2026
